



SUIT TO IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST ON LAND
HELD A TRANSITORY ACTION
Plaintiff corporation brought suit in the federal court for the northern
district of California against former employees alleging that while the de-
fendants were in control of the corporation they conveyed to themselves
large landholdings owned by the corporation. Plaintiff sought to impress
a constructive trust upon this property. Defendants moved to have the
action dismissed or transferred to the southern district where the lands
in question were located, 1 contending that a suit to impose a constructive
trust is in fact a means of testing the ownership of land, and thus is a local
action which must be brought in the district where the land is situated.
The defendants further argued that section 1655 of the Judiciary Act 2
requires all actions to impose a constructive trust on land to be brought in
the district where the land is located. The court rejected both of these
arguments, holding that the action was not local in nature, and that
the venue requirements of section 1655 are only applicable when the
plaintiff is using that section to obtain constructive service of process.
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Nickel, 149 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
In the federal courts, when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizen-
ship, venue of a transitory action normally lies in the place where all the
plaintiffs or all the defendants reside.3 Section 1392(b) of the Judiciary
Act provides that "any civil action, of a local 4 nature, involving property
located in different districts in the same State, may be brought in any of
such districts." 5 The courts have held that this section, by implication,
requires that in a local action involving only one district, the action may be
brought only within that district.0 If an action involves the naked
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1952) provides: "The district court of a district in which
is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or . . .
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought."
2. 28 U.S.C. §1655 (1952).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1952).
4. See Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880). "Local actions are in the nature of
suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted where the thing on which they are founded is
situated." Id. at 68. Some courts define local actions as those which could have arisen
only in a particular place and transitory actions as those which could have arisen any-
where. Others state that where the effect of the judgment cannot be had if it is laid
in the wrong place then the action is local, all other actions being transitory. Note,
70 HA v. L. RE.v. 708, 711 (1957).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1952).
6. Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880); Eddington v. Texas & N.O.R.R.,
83 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Tex. 1949) ; 3 MooPy, FEEaPF.A PRAcrscz 1 19.04 (2d ed. 1948).
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question of title to land, historically the action has been categorized as
local, and therefore it must be brought in the district court where the land is
located.7 However, where an action contains a so-called "mixed question"
involving both title to land and fraud, trust, or contract, the action has
been characterized as transitory.8 'Some courts following the leading case of
Massie v. Watts 9 have held that an attempt to impose a constructive
trust on land is a mixed question and therefore is transitory.10 Arguments
based on section 1655 of the Judiciary Act have questioned the validity of
these holdings. That section provides that when an action has been
brought to
"enforce any lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or
lien or cloud upon the title to, real or personal property within the
district, where any defendant cannot be served within the State, or does
not voluntarily appear, the court may order the absent defendant to
appear or plead by a day certain." 11
Although the primary function of this section is to permit plaintiffs to
obtain jurisdiction over absent defendants by means of constructive serv-
ice,' 2 the courts have held that once jurisdiction has been obtained
under this section a defendant may not contest venue.'2 Thus, by effec-
tively limiting venue in cases brought under section 1655 to the local dis-
trict, the section has come to have a secondary importance as a venue
statute. Although most of the actions brought under this section are
those commonly considered to be "local," 14 this section has often been used
by parties seeking to impose a constructive trust on land.15 Some
authorities argue that, since only local actions can be brought within
the scope of 1655 and since actions seeking to impose a constructive trust
7. Ibid.
8. Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 159 (1810). It is difficult to deter-
mine whether the term "local action" in this case referred to venue or jurisdiction.
Id. at 157-58. See also Mandley v. Backer, 121 F2d 875, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(referring to "local" action as a classification of jurisdiction) ; Landell v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 98 F. Supp. 479 (D.D.C. 1951); Blume, Action Quari in Rem Under Sec-
tion 1655, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1951).
9. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810).
10. See note 8 mpra.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1952).
12. See HART & WEcHsLER, THE FEDERaL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYST=m
954, 955 (1953) ; Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 708, 717 (1957).
13. Ibid.
14. Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U.S. 58 (1894); Proctor v. The Sagamore Big Game
Club, 128 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Pa. 1955) ; Consolidated Interstate Callahan Mining
Co. v. Callahan Mining Co., 228 Fed. 528 (D. Idaho 1915). However, not all actions
can be brought within the provisions of section 1655. See Ladew v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 179 Fed. 245 (S.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 218 U.S. 357 (1910).
15. Seven Oaks, Inc. v. FHA, 171 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Kelleam v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1940), rev'd o; other grounds, 312 U.S. 377 (1941) ;
Porter v. Cooke, 63 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1933); Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp.
765 (D. Neb. 1953) ; Robinson v. Seatex Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Tex. 1944).
See RosE, FEDEALr JURIsDICrIoN AND PROCEDURE 296-300 (4th ed. 1920).
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have been permitted under this section, this type of action is necessarily
local.' 6  The defendants advanced this argument. If they were correct,
section 1392 would require the instant suit, as a local action, to be brought
in the southern district of California.11 However, this argument failed to
convince the court since the language of section 1655 includes actions
involving both real and personal property, indicating that the object
of the section was not to distinguish between local and transitory actions,
but to permit constructive service of process in certain enumerated cases.
As an alternative, defendants argued that, disregarding any attempt to
label the instant action as "local" or "transitory," because of section 1655's
aforementioned venue significance 18 an action seeking to impose a con-
structive trust must be brought within the district in which the land
is situated. The court rejected this argument also, holding that since
section 1655 is p'ermissive in its language it does not establish the proper
venue in those cases where the plaintiff did not bring the action under that
section. Thus, the instant court found that it was not controlled either
by precedent or by clear statutory language.' 9
Where the question of proper venue is not governed by precedent
or statute it should not be decided merely by analogy to cases classically
categorized as "1o&l" or "transitory" since 'often' those decisions were
based on outmoded procedures and trial by jurors who were expected
to decide caS6se on their personal knowledge of the facts.2 ° Rather th venue
which would best serve the interests of all 'c6nceried should be sought. It
would seem that the instant court reached this result when it -denied
defendants' motion to dismiss' the action or transfer it to the southern
district. In a&iohs such as ejectment and trespass it might well be im-
portant to have tl e 'trial in the district where the land is situated since
the jury or court may need to view the'lahd, the location of the property
might be a decisive issue in the case, or it might be necessary for the
16. See' Kellean' v. MI~aryland" Cas. Co., 112' F.2d,. 940 (10th Cir. 1940),
rev'd on other giounds, -312 U.S. 377 (1941) (implies thAt only actions which are
"local" 'can be brougfit'under section 1655); -Blume, Actioi4' Qia-i ti Rem Uter
Section 1655, 50 Mi{cfr. L. Rav. 1, 15 (1951): "If an action to enforce'a trtust is a
"local action" it has become so because it may be maintained, as an action quasi in rem
under section 1655."
17. See text at note 6 .upra.
18. See text at note 13 supra.
19. There seems to be a split of authority on the' appliation in the federal courts
of state law regarding the distinctions between local and transitory actions. "In the
federal cases in which the issue has been discussed it has generally been' stated that
the definition [of local actions] of the forum state is controlling." Note, 70 HAiv.
L. Rmv. 708, 710 (1947). . See also Erwin v. Barrow,-217 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1954) ;
Josevig-Kennecott Copper Co. v. James F.- Howarth Co., 261 Fed. 576 (9th Cir.
1919) ; cf. Ex Parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 377 (1877). However, in reference to
similar problem of venue, courts have determined that- venue is a procedural problem
and, thus, application of state law is inappropriate. See Shaffer v. Tepper, 127 F.
Supp. 892, 893 (E.D. Ky. 1955) ; Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497, 499 (E.D. Pa.
1954). The problem would seem to be moot in'the instant case inasmuch as California
law seems to be in accord with the result of this case. See Neet v. Holmes, 19 Cal.
2d 605, 122 P.2d 557 (1942).
20. See Note, 70 HARv. L. IZEv. 708, 717 (1957).
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local sheriff to attach, deliver, or execute upon the property.2 1 However,
in an action to impose a constructive trust on land these factors are not
of primary concern, the important questions being whether a fiduciary re-
lationship existed2 2 and whether defendants used their position for per-
sonal benefit.m Similarly, none of the other factors which might dictate a
change of venue were present in the instant case. In actions involving
land, venue might be shifted if the foreign court lacks power to enforce its
judgment,24 but here the court found that through its equity power it
could compel the defendants to abide by its decree.m Also, venue might
be shifted to avoid inconvenience to one of the parties, 6 but in the instant
case the defendant did not show that there would be less expense or
burden in defending the suit if it had been brought in the southern dis-
trict. Finally, since all the defendants resided in the northern district
their natural desire to have the case decided by a local forum was satisfied 2 7
Constitutional Law-
SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY FEDERAL OFFICERS OF
NARCOTICS CONCEALED IN RECTUM OF SUSPECT
HELD "REASONABLE" AND NOT A VIOLATION
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
Defendant was stopped at the international boundary line in California
by customs officers.1 He was asked to remove his coat, whereupon num-
erous puncture marks were revealed in the veins of his arms. 2  The in-
21. See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MicH. L. REv.
307 (1951).
22. See Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Burline, 231 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1956),
where the plaintiffs were unable to establish the fiduciary relationship necessary to
impress a trust
23. A constructive trust is imposed by a court of equity whenever a person
clothed with a fiduciary duty gains some personal advantage by availing himself of his
situation. Scott, Contructive Trusts, 71 L.Q. REv. 39, 47 (1955).
24. See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 708, 712 (1957).
25. See also 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 157-58; 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. V),
(1958): "A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property now or
hereafter entered in any district court which has become final by appeal . . . may
be registered in any other district by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment.
A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district
court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner."
26. The convenience of the parties has been legislatively recognized. See 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
27 A litigant might feel that a "local" judge and jury would be more sympathetic
to his claims than would be a body of persons unknown to him.
1. Search of persons, vehicles and vessels by customs inspectors is authorized
by 49 STAT. 521 (1935), 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1952) ; 46 STAT. 748 (1930), 19 U.S.C.
§1582 (1952); Rsv. STAT. §3061 (1875), 19 U.S.C. §482 (1952).
2. Defendant admitted to the officers that he was an occasional user of narcotics
and that he was then on parole from a California state conviction for possession of
marijuana.
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spectors then directed defendant to disrobe entirely and, upon his so
doing, noticed a large quantity of greasy substance about his rectum. De-
fendant admitted that he had heroin, concealed in his rectum.3 Thereafter,
he was taken to the United States Naval Hospital where, despite his
denial of concealment and resistance to the procedure, the heroin was
forcibly removed by medical personnel. In a subsequent prosecution for
illegal importation and concealment of heroin, defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence thus obtained was denied. The circuit court af-
firmed, holding that the search and seizure did not constitute a violation of
the fourth or fifth amendments.4 Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958).
Although the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures,5 it does not preclude the use in a criminal trial of evidence ob-
tained by such a search.0 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declared
that such evidence is inadmissible in the federal courts. 7 The federal ex-
clusionary rule does not extend to state courts." A state search and seizure
in violation of the fourth amendment may be so outrageous, however, that
the use of its fruits as evidence in a state prosecution violates due process.
In Rochin v. California 9 the Supreme Court held that the conduct of state
police officers in breaking into the upstairs room of a suspected dope
addict, assaulting him and then pumping his stomach to recover morphine
tablets which he had swallowed so "shocked the conscience" that the use of
the morphine as evidence in a prosecution of the suspect violated 'lue pro-
cess. In Irvine v. California 10 the Court held that due process had not been
violated when evidence was obtained for a state prosecution by placing a
dictaphone in a suspected bookmaker's bedroom for the period of one
month, although the procedure was termed "a flagrant violation of the
fourth amendment." "- 'The Irvine decision thus appears to limit the'appli-
cation of the Rochin doctrine to instances of brutality, coercion or violence
to the person, as opposed to trespasses upon property and invasions of
privacy. Not all invasions of the body are violations of due process, how-
ever. In the recent case of Breithaupt v. Abram,'2 the Court upheld a state
3. Instant case at 747.
4; The court disposed of the fifth amendment self-incrimination issue on the basis
of the distinction between real evidence and testimonial evidence. McCoRMicK, EvI-
DENcE § 126 (1954) ; 8 WiGmoE, EviDExcE § 2263 (3d ed. 1941). The question of
fifth amendment due process is never reached in a federal search and seizure case
since the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness is stricter than that of due
process.
5. U. S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See FE. R. CnM_. P. 26.
8. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See the appendix of Justice Frankurter's
opinion for the status of the Weeks doctrine in the several states. Id. at 33-39.
9. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
10. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
11. Id. at 132.
12. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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conviction based on the results of an alcoholic blood test performed by
medically approved means on an unconscious motor vehicle homicide sus-
pect.
Whether a search of private property by federal officers is reasonable
is determined by the facts and circumstances of the individual case. 13
Nofmally the obtaining of a warrant is a requirement, but when the
search is incident to a lawful arrest the failure to obtain a warrant does
not necessarily make the search unreasonable. 14 Thus, in United States v.
Rabhwwitz 5 the search of a one-room office without a search warrant,
following a lawful arrest therein, was held reasonable even though there had
been time for the police to procure one. The use of a stomach pump and an
emetic to recover swallowed narcotics has been considered unreasonable
by two district courts, 16 but the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the rea-
sonableness of an internal search of the body, nor has it adopted a fourth
amendment standard for such searches.
1l
Although the fourth amendment does not, in terms distinguish between
searches of property and searches of the body, accepted notions of the
13. Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruling Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable
to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion
in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case."
Id. at 66. See Marshall, How Far Can Federal Officers Search in Cwuwction With
an Arrest?, 41 J. Cnna. L., C. & P.S. 325 (1950).
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (dictum). See People v.
Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923); MAcHEN, LAW oF SAcRH AND
SEizuRE 66 (1950). Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) ; United States v. Leftkowitz, 285 U.S.
452 (1932) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
15. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
16. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Io re Guzzardi,
84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1949). See also The Suprene Court, 1951 Term, 66
HARv. L. REv. 89, 122 (1952). One federal district has found such an internal
search reasonable on the authority of the instant case. In United States v. Michel,
158 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1957), a fluoroscopic examination disclosed a foreign
object in the abdomen of one of the defendants. After objection the defendant
finally consented to dosages of castor oil and epsom salts and the secreted heroin
was disgorged. The court did not find any coercion or brutality on the part of the
officials and found that the defendant consented to the procedure throughout al-
though there was no admission present. The court did not think it unreasonable
to use a method to dislodge the heroin which the defendant himself might have
employed had he not been apprehended. Cf. Haynes v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 52,
143 S.W2d 617 (1940); Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 420, 141 SAV.2d 341
(1940).
See also Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1957), where the
court denied an application for habeas corpus to a defendant convicted by a state
court on evidence obtained in a manner practically identical to that of the instant
case, stating that such methods are not a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Cf. Novak v. District of Columbia, 82 App. D.C. 95, 49 A.2d
88 (1946), revd on other grounds, 160 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; People v. Woods,
139 Cal. App. 2d 532, 293 P.2d 901 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1006 (1957).
17. For a comprehensive history of the fourth amendment see Trimble, Search
and Seizure Under the Fourth Aiwdment as Interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, 41 Ky. L.J. 196, 388 (1953), 42 Ky. L.J. 197, 423 (1954). See also
Fraenkel, Search and Seizure Developments in Federal Law Since 1948, 41 IowA
L. REv. 67 (1956).
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dignity of the body and its greater'sanctity compared with property
present the question of whether internal bodily searches should be per-
mitted under any circumstances.' 8 One position advanced is that the
body is inviolate and all internal searches are therefore unreasonable.19
It may .be contended, as did the dissent in the instant case, that such a
position would not necessarily compel the loss of evidence concealed in
the body. It could ultimately be recovered simply by "waiting for nature
to take its course." 7o This argument, however, appears impractical since
in many cases such evidence will decompose within the body. If it does
not, constant surveillance is necessary to prevent the suspect from himself
recovering the evidence and destroying or otherwise disposing of it.
Moreover, the right to habeas corpus 4' and bail 22 may make it difficult to
retain custody of the suspect for a sufficient length of time. Thus, the
effect of a prohibition of internal bodily search would be to place
valuable evidence beyond the reach of enforcement officials. This ex-
treme seems unnecessary,; at least in those cases in which the obtaining
of such evidence would entail no pain or indignity to the individual.
If some bodily invasions are to be permitted, it becomes necessary
to establish a standard by which the reasonableness of a given invasion
may be judged. The instant court stressed three factors upon-which it
based its conclusion that the search incident to the lawful arrest of the
defendant was reasonable-the presence of probable cause to believe
defendant had internally concealed narcotics, the absence of pain and
danger incident to the search, and the gravity of the social problem
pIresented by narcotics violations.2 3 For a search of property to be reason-
able when made-in conjunction with a lawful arrest it is only necessary
that the requirements of Rabinowitz be satisfied.24 There need be no
additional grounds to believe that the search will produce evidence since
the courts find such a search necessary to' disclose concealed weapons and
fruits of the crime for which the suspect was arrested.2 5 Probable cause
is normally used in cases involving property searches in reference to the
legality of the arrest, ie., whether there were grounds to believe that the
18. The physical abuse of the suspect appeared to be the basis on which Irvine v.
California was distinguished from Rochin v. California. See also the vigorous dis-
sents of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Black to the police procedures
which involved bodily invasion in Breithaupt v. Abram where the issue was one of
due process and not the more restrictive standard of reasonableness. See note 19
infra.
19. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Black dissenting in Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. at 440. Cf. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C.
1957).
20. Instant case at 755.
21. FED. R. Cpam. P. 5 (a) (suspect must be given hearing without unnecessary
delay).
22. FED. R. Cams. P. 46(1).
23. Instant case at 752.
24. See note 13 supra.
25. MAcHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 66 (1950).
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suspect committed the crime,26 but in the instant case the term was also
used in reference to the reasonableness of the belief that defendant had
narcotics concealed internally. Here the factors determinative of whether
there was probable cause, first to arrest and then to search, were substan-
tially the same since the offense suspected was possession of narcotics.
However, had the defendant been lawfully arrested for murder the factors
establishing probable cause to believe that that crime had been committed
would not necessarily provide grounds for believing he had concealed
evidence internally. It would seem proper to require this additional show-
ing to justify an internal bodily search since the reasons for permitting
a search of property whenever there has been a lawful arrest, i.e., to
discover weapons and fruits of the crime for which he is arrested, are not
operative. In the instant case, the court found that the inspectors had
probable cause on which to make a search since they knew defendant was
an addict on parole from a state drug conviction, they observed a greasy
substance about his rectum, and defendant admitted that he was illegally,
in possession of narcotics. - These facts were dearly sufficient to support a
belief that a search would produce evidence of the crime.2 7
One writer has suggested that the prime consideration in determining
the reasonableness of internal searches should be the pain and danger to
the suspect,2 8 and the instant court appears to have given this factor
considerable weight. 29  However, the imposition of slight discomfort, as
by a hypodermic needle, or of slight danger, as from the remote possibility
of infection from a skin puncture, does not appear sufficient to justify the
prohibition of all internal searches if the evidence is not otherwise obtain-
able 30 and the crime which is suspected is one which the public has a
substantial need to detect. Yet it may be readily conceded that both due
process and the requirements of reasonableness demand that the individual
not be subjected to torture or extreme danger. 
Some limits are necessary.
Pain and danger are incapable of precise measurement and these limits
must of necessity be set in terms of particular factual situations., In
fixing these limits the use of professional personnel to perform the search,
the place where the search is conducted, and the care used to avoid unneces-
26. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
27. The factors which constituted sufficient probable cause to search a moving
vehicle in Brinegar, supra note 26, were quite analogous to those found in the instant
case. The defendant had a reputation of "liquor running" and had been previously
arrested for illegally transporting liquor. He had been seen by the arresting officer
loading liquor into a truck or car at least twice previously. The car defendant was-
driving appeared heavily loaded, and he was near the border of "dry" Oklahoma
coming from "wet" Joplin, Missouri, where liquor could be purchased legally. - The
defendant also made a voluntary admission of the possession of the liquor before the
search was made, but this was not considered an essential element of the officer's
probable cause. See Comment, Requiremen:ts for Proving Probable Cause, 29 B.U.L.
RF'v. 540 (1949). For a collection of cases see Note, Probable Cause in Searches and
Seizures, 3 ST. Lous U.L.J. 36 (1955).
28. Bachelder, Use of Stomach Pumps as Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41
J. Cmm. L., C. & P.S. 189 (1951).
29. Instant case at 752.
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sary pain should be considered. Some pain was obviously imposed on the
suspect in the instant case. The court, however, considered this pain
minor, particularly in view of the fact that much of the pain was brought
about by the defendant's physical resistance. Moreover, the procedure used
was a relatively simple one, involving little danger of lasting illness or
disability. The court's decision to consider only the pain and danger
which would have attended a seardh of this nature had the suspect not
resisted appears proper since otherwise a premium would be placed on
violent resistance.
The final factor the court considered in reathing its conclusion that
the search was reasonable was the enormity of the evil presented by the
illegal use and importation of narcotics. Many facts to support the court's
concern over this problem are found in House31 and Senate 2 committee
hearings on illicit narcotics traffic. Other studies have shown that addic-
tion gives impetus to crime on a nationwide scale and is increasing among
the juvenile segment of the population.3 Further, narcotics laws have
been traditionally difficult to enforce; 4 border police and customs in-
spectors are often without the physical facilities and the funds necessary
to cope with unlawful imports. The court also took judicial notice of the
fact that in the last two and one-half years twenty per cent of the smuggling
cases in the San Diego area involved narcotics concealed in body cavities.3 6
The Supreme Court has in other circumstances looked to the magnitude
and difficulty of the problem facing society to determine the reasonableness
of a search and seizure. In The Appollon 7 judicial notice was taken of
the smuggler's-cove nature of a river in determining whether customs
officers had probable cause to search a freighter and seize its cargo.
30. Whether a drunken driving suspect is under the influence of alcohol may be
determined by breath tests or physical coordination examinations. If the degree of
alcoholic content is the issue, however, this fact may be established only by a blood
test, there being no alternative means of obtaining the evidence.
31. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Traffic in, and Control of,
Narcotics, Barbiturates and Amphetamines of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-1633 (1956).
32. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Improvements in the Federal
Criminal Code of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.,
pts. 1-4, at 1-1301 (1957).
33. Finestone, Narcotics and Criminality, 22 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoa. 69 (1957).
34. King, Narcotic Drug Laws and Enforcement Policies, 22 LAw & CoNTEmp.
PROB. 113 (1957). See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Illicit Narcotics
Traflic, S. Rep. No. 1440, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1955) ; see also Anslinger, Narcotic
Addiction as Seen by the Law-Enforcement Officer, 21 FE. Paoa. 34 (1957).
35. The Narcotics Problem, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 405, 479-86 (1954).
36. Instant case at 752. The government's brief cited six unreported cases in
which motions to suppress had been denied where search of body cavities had disclosed
concealed narcotics. The government also alleged that the amount of heroin recovered
from Blackford was 1.333 ounces which cost about $800 in Mexico and which could
be retailed when "cut" for $25,000 in the United States. Brief for Appellee, instant
case.
37. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 361 (1824).
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Carroll v. United States38 developed the "moving vehicle" exception to
the search warrant requirement to meet the problem of enforcing the
prohibition law created by the mobile nature of automobiles. Breithaupt
v. Abram considered highway accident and mortality rates and the interest
of the community in controlling drunken driving in deciding that the
taking of blood from the suspect was not a violation of due process. 9 Con-
cededly, the presence of this factor makes a given search seem less ob-
jectionable, but it would appear likely that in all cases in which an internal
search is made some pressing social problem will be present and this factor
will have little independent significance in determining the reasonableness
of a given search.
The greater sanctity of the body as compared to property suggests
that a search warrant should be required before an internal bodily search
is made even though it is performed in conjunction with a lawful arrest.
Such a requirement would tend to insure that the procedure was per-
formed in a clinical fashion by authorized personnel and would lessen the
danger of abuse by overenthusiastic officersA° The difficulty presented
in requiring a warrant at all times is the possibility of the decomposition
in the body and the necessity of closely watching the prisoner until the
warrant is obtained. A possible compromise would be a return in this
limited area to the Trupiano v. United States 41 standard of requiring a
warrant whenever time permits. Under such a standard a warrant would
not be required where the possibility of loss of the evidence through de-
composition is present. The necessity of constant surveillance of the
prisoner during the interim between arrest and search would, of course,
remain, but the custodial burden thus imposed does not seem too great in
view of the added protection to the individual.
Corporation Law-
SHAREHOLDERS OF TWO-MAN CORPORATION HELD
TO HAVE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
WHEN CONTRACTING WITH EACH OTHER FOR
THE FUTURE SALE OF STOCK
The shareholders of a two-man roofing and sheet-metal corporation
executed an agreement providing that upon the death of either the survivor
38. 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925). The Court also considered the proximity of the
suspects to a Canadian border area notorious for liquor smuggling.
39. 352 U.S. at 439 (1957).
40. The warrant would issue only on a sworn affidavit, where the commissioner
was satisfied that there was probable cause, and would name the person to be searched
and describe the property sought. FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(c). It is also conceivable
that the warrant could name the medical personnel to conduct the search and the
methods to be used.
41. 334 U.S. 699 (1948). The test was not whether the search incident to the
lawful arrest was "reasonable under the circumstances," as in Rabinowitz, but whether
the arresting officers had a reasonable time to procure a search warrant prior to the.
arrest.
1958]
1172 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
was obligated 'to buy the deceased's stock for ten dollars per share., This
price represented the value of the stock at the time of the-agreement. The
contrat'gave the' parties the right to redetermine the price at the end of
each fiscal year, the last;price -,st prior"tc the-death of, either, party being
conclusive.' Drafted solelk 'by. theminorityr shareholder, a man thirty-
three years younger 'and much better schooled inbusiness and the law
than -his -co-vefnturer,.,the agreement, also Zontained provisions, which
prevenfed,the'majority shareholder;frm' 'unilaterally dissolving-the corpo-
ration or'voting, a complete disposition of the firm's assets. There was no
evidence that either 'shaireholderiequestedna .price redeterinination during
the course of eight years of active association prior to the death of the
majority shareholder, although.-by that time the book value of the stock had
appreciated to approximatelyeightyi dollarspdr share. The,administratrii
of the majority i'shareholder's, estate requested; the court; to cancel the
survivor-purchase, agreement unless the; defendant would, agree to pay the
appreciated book value of the sto&... Contending that under the agreement
any 'price change would require his c6nsent and-that since it vas never
his intention at anyr tiri to- consent to any [price], change," 2 defendant
argued ,that ;plaintiff, was 6bligatedrto transfer the stock at ten 'dollars per
share.r Summary judgment forthe defendant. renderedb, ,the district
court was, reversed on appeal, .the.' court- stating that ,"the holders of
closely held stock in a'corporation such as 'shown here bear a fiduciary
duty- to deal fairly, honestly, and openly with their fellow- stockholders and
to ,make disclbsure of all essential information." 3.; The court, found that
the failure. of ,the, minority .shareholder to disclose* hi intent 'never 'to
consent' to any price- change constituted a, bredch, of,:this .fiduciary duty
which "standing alone" warrantedbancellationof the agreement. 'The fact
that the older man apparently relied upon the better trained defendant to
draft the contract was given as an additional reason for holding the defend-
ant to a duty of full disclosure.4 Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482
(D.C. Cir. 1957). .' , -.' - ., _
Corporate officers,-kdirectors .and-icontrolling shareholderis aretech-
nically not trustees,. afthoig'i in-'th ''administration of corporate affairs
1. The various problems in this type 0 agreenient aiidsonie suggested'answers
are discussed in Currie, Buy and Sell Agreements With Respect to Corporate and
Pdrtnership Interests, 1950 Wis. 'L. it~v. 12; O'Neal, Restrfctions n Transfer of
Stock in Closely Held1 Corporatid:, 'Planning and Drafting, 65 HAnv. L., REv., 773
(1952).
2. Instant case at 486.. Inasmuch as the ,majority shareholder .was thirty-three
years older than the minority shareholder, it was in the interest of, the defendant to keep
the price low.
3. Instant case.at487." - ,
4.,The, decision also could :have been placed on contract grounds since under
contract law a promise made without the'intent to perform it constitutes, fraud and
renders the agreement voidable. REsTATEmMNT, Com-RAcrs §§473, 476 (1932).
Similar agreements have withstood the challenge that they are tesfamentary in char-
acter and therefore void for-failure. to comply -with the statutory requirements.govern-
ing wills. ,, E.g., Chase Ndt'l Bankv. Manufacturers Trust Co.,, 265 App. Div. 406,
39,.Y-S.2d 370 (Ist Dep't 1943).. . , .
5. Title to corporate property is vested in the artificial entity known as the
corporation. See 1 BoamT, TR sTs AxD TRusTEEs § 16 (1951).
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and with respect to the corporation and the shareholders as a body they
stand in a relationship analog6us. to that of trustee and beneficiary. Thus,
such acts as an officer-director casting the determining vote to increase his
salary as an officer,7 controlling shareholders instituting a statutory
dissolution of a lucrative corporation for the purpose of acquiring complete
control of the corporation's business,8 and'controlling shareholders selling
their shares and immediately resigning their positions as officers in order
to leave the corporation's negotiable assets at the mercy of the purchasers 9
have been held by the courts to constitute i breach of fiduciary duty. Iow-
ever, the majority view of the courts is that no fiduciary relationship exists
between corporate officials or controlling shareholders and other share-
holders when the parties are buying and selling ihares between 'them-
selves.10  Thus, where officials' have purchased outstanding stock without
disclosing facts material to the value of the stock, most courts have held
that the official is not liable to the shai-eholdeis for profits from the trans-
action." One of these'courts has felt. it impractical to impose a duty
of disclosure of true stock values upon a corporate official who purchases
in the open market,'2 while another has reasoned that, since corporate
officials do not have the control over the shareholder's property interest in
his stock that they exercise over the corporation's, assets, the analogy to
the relationship of trustee and beneficiary is inappropriate.13  Implicit in
these holdings is the recognition that in the traditional corporation there
is a separation of management from ownership, In such a business there
is absent the close relationship between the corporate official or controlling
shareholder and minority shareholder that breeds a fiduciary duty.' 4 But
where the corporation differs. from the traditional, and the relationship
between the parties becomes more intimate, the courts have realized that
the application of the majority rule works harsh results. Thus, an exception
to the rule was made in the leading case of, Strong v. Repide.15 There the
Supreme Court announced its "special facts" doctrine, under which the
court examines the particular relationship between the corporate official
6. 3 Fximrcm, CYcLoPrD CoaRoRAinoxs § 8381 (perm. ed. 1947) ; 13 id. § 5811
(perm. ed. 1943), and cases collected therein.
7. Schaffhauser v. Araholt & Schafer Brewing Co., 218 Pa. 298, 67 At!. 417
(1907).
8. Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123,N.E. 148 (1919).
9. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 30 N.Y.S2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
10. Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873);_ Cromwell v. Jackson,
53 N.J.L. 656, 23 Atl. 426 (Ct Err. & App. 1891). See also Chenery Corp v. SEC,
128 F2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Dunnett v. Ar, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934);
Gardner v. Baldi, 24 N.J. Super. 228, 93 A.2d 644 (Ch. 1952). Contra, Oliver v.
Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
11. Ibid.
12. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
13. Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873).
14. See Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rrv. 725, 746-47
(1956). See also text at notes 20-21 infra.
15. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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and the shareholder to see if there are special circumstances which require
a fiduciary duty to make disclosure of material facts bearing upon a sale of
stock between the- two."' In Strong the Court was presented with a small
"paper" corporation formed for the specific purpose of selling the land
which was its sole asset. The Court held that the majority shareholder, who
was also a director and the chief negotiator with prospective purchasers,
had breached his fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to the minority
shareholder whose stock he had purchased that pending negotiations had
multiplied the value of the stock almost tenfold. Many courts following
the Strong approach have considered the particular distribution of the
ownership of the stock of the corporation involved as one of the "special
facts" operative in their conclusion that a fiduciary relationship of dis-
closure existed between a corporate official and the complaining share-
holder; 17 but none has gone as far as the instant court did in ruling that
a shareholder incurs a fiduciary obligation to disclose information relating
to the true stock value solely on the basis of his membership in a close
corporation.
The instant court felt that to apply the majority view would be to
,ignore the practical distinctions between the close and the open corpo-
ration.18 Thus, the court stated that since in the close corporation there is
an "absence of a division between the stockholder-owners and the director-
managers," 19 the business venture is more aptly termed an "incorporated
partnership." Rules similar to those which govern the relationship between
partners were therefore held to govern the instant case. 0  One of the es-
sential features of small businesses, the trust and confidence that the co-
venturers in the business must place in each other to maintain a smooth
running business, does not depend upon the legal categorization of the
business association as a partnership or a corporation. Therefore, the
court's decision to ignore the corporate entity and impose upon the share-
holders a partnership-type standard of conduct seems correct. This decision
gives to shareholders in the close corporation both a standard of disclosure
with. which the business associates may gauge their conduct when buying
and selling stock, and a tool which the courts may use to insure that any
16. See Smith, Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director From a Share-
holder, 19 MicH. L. REv. 698 (1921), for an analysis of "special facts" cases.
17. George v. Ford, 36 App. D.C. 315 (1911) (two-man lumber corporation);
Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P2d 980 (1940) (small group of investors
in investment corporation) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill.
App. 134, 108 N.E2d 493 (1952) (three-man movie theater corporation).
18. Writers have long advocated the judicial recognition of these distinctions.
See Hornstein, ."udiciai Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW & CON-
Tlmp. PoB. 435 (1953) ; Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, 19 U. CHI.
L. RE . 778 (1952); Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law." 28
Coa-xau. L.Q. 313 (1943) ; Note, 71 HAav. L. REv. 1498 (1958).
19. Instant case at 486.
20. When purchasing a co-partner's interests, a partner has a duty to disclose
facts bearing on the transaction which are not open to the other partner. Brooks v.
Martin, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 70 (1863) ; Caldwell v. Davis, 10 Colo. 481, 15 Pac. 696
(1887); Poss v. Gottieib, 118 Misc. 318, 193 N.Y. Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1922);
Guggenheim v. Guggenheim, 95 Misc. 332, 159 N.Y. Supp. 333 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
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trust in fact placed by one co-venturer in another is not misused. In the
latter respect the rule of the instant case will be particularly useful in
aiding the courts to deal with stock-purchase agreements. These agree-
ments are extremely common among the owners of close corporations.
21
Often very complex, the typical agreement includes either a mandatory
sale-and-purchase provision or an option to buy the corporation's stock at
the death or retirement of a stockholder, or when a stockholder wishes to
dispose of his stockY22 These agreements arise out of the desire of the
incorporating shareholders to preserve the power to choose their future
business associates or keep the ownership of the corporation's stock among
themselves. In addition, each shareholder wishes to secure a guaranteed
price for his stock in the event of his death or retirement from the busi-
nessP Part of the past judicial reluctance 2 4 to give complete effect to
several types of these contracts may well have been based upon a concern
that the contracts might serve as an incentive to force a shareholder to
retire, or be discharged, or that the purchase option would be exercised
only when the stock was of an unusual value 25 To prevent seemingly
unconscionable results from arising out of these contracts the courts
either have strained property2 6 or contract 27 principles, or resorted to
21. See Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA.
L. REV. 229 (1951) ; O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Cor-
poration: Planning and Drafting, 65 HAmv. L. REv. 773 (1952).
22. O'Neal, supra note 21, at 773-74.
23. In the close corporation the shareholders often take their income in the form
of salaries as management; dividends are often non-existent. Unless a purchaser is
assured of a managerial position, either by stipulation or by purchase of control, to
him the shares are practically worthless. Therefore, unlike the case of large corpo-
rations where the stock is traded over-the-counter or on an exchange, there is seldom
a ready market for the shares of a small closely held corporation other than the other
shareholders. See O'Neal, supra note 21, at 774.
24. See generally Cataldo, supra note 21; Currie, Buy and Sell Agreements With
Respect to Corporate and Partnership Interests, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 12; O'Neal, supra
note 21.
25. In Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch.
1938), an option given to the corporation by its charter to purchase shares of holders
whenever it felt the Vurchase was necessary to insure the harmonious conduct of the
business was held to be an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of the shares.
In discussing the restraint the court said: "Asset values fluctuate from day to day,
not to say from year to year. By discreet selection of the times to buy, the directors
would have the stockholders at their mercy, and by the same token no stockholder
would ever be reasonably sure of his investment." Id. at 403, 2 A.2d at 253. In
Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951), the court held valid an option
agreement under which the directors of the corporation were given first option to
purchase stock at the then book value of the stock if a holder wished to sell his shares
or if a shareholder died or ceased to be connected with the corporation. The dissent
argued that under these provisions the present directors, through favoritism in choosing
to exercise their options or not, could perpetuate themselves in office.
26. Cf. Victor J. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 At. 1127 (1896) ; Ireland
v. Globe Milling Co., 21 R.I. 9, 41 Atl. 258 (1898).
27. Cf. Topken, Loring & Swartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735
(1928), where the court held that a promise by the corporation to purchase the shares
of a-holder upon termination of employment was illusory on the rationale that the
corporation might not have the funds available from which it could legally purchase
the shares at that time.
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"public policy" ' 8 grounds. The instant decision will allow courts to
,oversee these'agreements in the light of a more flexible standaid. Until
-adequate legislation provides some type of arrangement whereby these
peculiar needs of the close corporation are tsatisfied, such a result is
satisfactory.,
I Not all stock dealings in ,close corporations,; fiowever, wotld seem to
require a duty' of disclosure different from that required in- open corpo-
rations. For example,, where some of a close corporations " shares sold
or purchased are owned by a professional investor who does not 'participate
in the 'corporation's management, or where the shares are held by an
'employee who has been-.given a few shares to insuie' hs continued loyalty
to the:corporation; there'would seem to be no reason to'employ a different
standard than that applied to open corporations. "The: relationship of the
investor to the corporation's ianagement, or -the employee to, his em-
ployer, would not seem to differ merely because the stock of 'the corpo-
rafion with which their were associated was wid6ly or narrowly held, or
freely traded or restricted in its market. It is likely, therefore, that future
courts using- the rule of the instant case will not extend its application
beyond situations involving manager-shareholders dealing with each' other.
Criminal Law--
KILLINGOF FELON BY POLICE' OFFICER DURING
PERPETRATION, OF ROBBERY DOES NOT MAKE
CO-FELON CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA FELONY-MURDER RULE
Upon leavinz a restaurant -where they had conmitid arm-ed robbery,
defendant and anaccoinplice were confronted by police officers. Defendant
opened fire, and, in the ensuing gun battle, defendant's accomplice was
fatally. w6unded, by bullets fired by the police. 'Defendant Was 'convicted of
murder'in the nrst ctegree an sentenced to life imprisonment. The Sujreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that, since the killing of the co-felon
was justifiable homicide, defendant could not be'guilty of murder. Com-
mbi'wealtlh v. Redline, 391 Pa.!486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
In determining' the criminal responsibility of a felon for the' lethal acts
,of, someone other than himself which occur during ihe commission 6f a
felony, two theories have been operative.' Under the agency theory, the
28. E.g., Greene v. E. H..Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22- Del. Ch. 394, 2 A2d 249
(Ch. 1938).
-.I 1. See generally Hitchler, The Killer and His Victhm in Felony Murder Cases,
53 DicK. L. REv. 3 (1948); Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U.
Prrr. L. RE ..51 (1956)'; Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal 'Acts of
Others, 105. U. PA. L. REv. 50 (1956) ; Note, Recent Extensions of the Felony Murder
Ride, 31 Iiryn. L.J. 534 (1956); Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEmP. L.Q.
453 (1953).
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felon is responsible only for those killings perpetrated by a co-felon. 2 The
act of killing is imputed to the felon by the existence of the consipracy in
furtherance of which the killing is, perpetrated.3 One exception to this
theory exists in the so-calfed "shield" 4 and "alternate danger" I cases, in
which it is held that the fact that the felon either uses his victim as a
breastwork or uses him to do some act in the furtherance of the felony
by which the victim is placed in a dangerous position is sufficient to impute
the act of killing to the felon. These cases appear to be the seed of the
proximate cause theory, which reqtiires only that the death be a natural or
reasonably forseeable result of the felon's acts.6 ' The agency theory was
generally followed in the United States 1 until the recent case of Common-
wealth v. Moyer,8 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that
a murder conviction of a person perpetrating a holdup was proper even
though thi shots which killed the victims may have been fired by another
victim, rather than by one of the felons.9 Although it was not clear whether
the court's. statement in the Moyer case was holding or dictum,'0 this
temporary confusion was clarified by Commonwealth v. Almeida," in
which a conviction for the murder of a policeman during the commission
of a robbery was affirmed even though the fatal shots were fired by another
policeman, the court reasoning that the commission of the felony was the
proximate cause of the killing.'2 The proximate cause theory was extended
in Commonwealth v. Thoma 3 to the killing of a co-felon by the victim
2. E.g., Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E.. 338 (1888) ; Commonwealth v.
Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass.
(7 Allen) 541 (1863)'; State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922) (semble) ; State
v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924); cf. People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293,
127 N.E. 75 (1920) ; People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930).
3. Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953).
4. Wilson v. State, 188 Axrk. 846, 68 S.W2d 100 (1934).
5. Keaton v. State, '41 Tex. Crim. 62i, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State,
41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900).
6. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 192-93, 53 A.2d 736, 742 (1947).
7. The only exception to the denial of responsibility where the lethal act was
committed by someone other than one of the felons prior to 1947 was People v. Payne,
359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E 539 (1935).
8. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
9. The court, at least by implication, had approved the "agency or furtherance of
the felonious design" foimula. prior to the Moyer case. Commonwealth v. Thompson,
321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl. 97 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 Atl. 534
(1928); cf. Commonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 At. 24 (1922).
10. The statement of the court has been cited as holding, instant case at 522,
137 A2d at 487 (dissenting opinion), dictum, id. at 504, 137 A2d at 480, and authority,
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 603, 68 A2d 595, 599 (1949).
11. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
12. Lower court applications of the Almeida rule have found the principles used
where the charge was aggravated assault and battery, Commonwealth v. Wheatley,
89 Pa. D.&C. 261 (Q.S. 1954), and suggested as pertinent where a new trial iune
pro tu was granted, because of newly discovered evidence, to a murder suspect for
a crime allegedly committed in 1926. Commonwealth v. Harris, 1 Pa. D. & C2d 143,
151 (Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1954).
13. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A2d 204 (1955).
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during the flight following a robbery, and in Commonwealth v. Bolish 14
to the accidental death of a co-felon who, through his own negligence, was
trapped by fire during the commission of arson. The courts of several
other states have adopted the rule established in the Almeida case.15
To decide as it did in the instant case, the court was compelled to
overrule the Thomas decision.' 0 In so doing, however, it declined, to over-
rule Almeida, although it could easily have done so by repudiating the
proximate cause test. Almeida was distinguished on the basis that in that
case the homicide was merely excusable, while in Thomas and the instant
case it was justifiable.17 Such a distinction seems unsupportable. If
criminal responsibility of a felon is to be based on the tendency of his
felonious act to cause death, it should make no difference whether the
person killed is a co-felon, victim, policeman, or bystander.'8 Indeed, if
there is any greater likelihood that the felony will result in the death of one
of these persons, it falls upon the co-felon. Nor can the distinction be
supported on the ground of its deterrent value. If the purpose of the
felony-murder rule is to deter the commission of the felony itself, the
maximum deterrence is supplied by holding the felon responsible in both
the Almeida and Thomas situations. If the purpose is merely to deter the
use of lethal weapons, whether the purpose is furthered by holding the
felon responsible for the acts of third persons involves the question of
whether, in his eyes, the increased likelihood of death when weapons are
used is offset by the increased likelihood of success and escape. Depending
on the answer to this question, maximum deterrence is supplied by holding
the felon responsible in both or in neither case. Finally, if the rationale
of the instant decision is the conceptualistic one that the act of killing itself
was not unlawful and therefore cannot be murder, the rationale applies
equally to the Almeida situation where the homicide,'was excusable. 19
Commonwealth v. Thomas and the Pennsylvania extensions of the
felony-murder rule have been widely criticized on the grounds that they
violate "basic fairness," 20 reverse a trend toward narrowing the rule be-
14. 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955). Contra, People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587,
265 Pac. 230 (1928).
15. People v. Wilburn, 314 P2d 590 (Cal. App. 1957); Hornbeck v. State, 77
So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955) (dictum) ; People v. Podolskd, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201
(1952) ; cf. Hinrichs v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 71 Nev. 168, 283 P2d 614 (1955).
16. Instant case at 489, 137 A.2d at 473.
17. Id. at 510, 137 A.2d at 483. "Under the older common law a homicide was
justifiable where the person committing it killed in strict performance of a legal duty;
and it was excusable where it was committed accidentally or in self-defense." MILEmR,
CamixA_ L.w § 83 (1934).
18. See Morris, sgpra note 1, at 56.
19. "Sir Edward Coke said that anciently excusable homicide was punished by
death; but this is probably not true. It was certainly punished, however, by forfeiture
of goods and chattels. Now it is no longer punished at all, either in England or in
the United States." CLARx & MARSHALL, CRIEs §274 (5th ed. 1952).
20. Schultz, Criminal Law and Procedure, in 1955-56 Survey of Pennsylvania
Law, 18 U. Pirr. L. REv. 216, 221 (1957).
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cause of its ineptness in punishing culpability,2 ' are contrary to the sub
silentio precedent of centuries, mingle tort causation principles with
criminal sanctions without an effort to weigh the policy considerations
involved, and invade the traditional province of the legislature in deter-
mining criminal policy.24 The deterrent value of the extensions has also
been seriously questioned. While these objections constitute a convincing
argument for overruling the Almeida-Thomas rule, it is questionable
whether a partial revocation of that rule is sufficiently desirable to justify
the distinction drawn in the instant case.
It is possible, however, to read the instant decision as an implied
repudiation of the proximate cause theory. Such a reading seems par-
ticularly tenable in light of the court's decision on the second Bolish case,26
decided the same day. In the original case, the court held that defendant
could be tried for murder on the ground that the felony was the proximate
cause of the co-felon's death, but granted a new trial because of the use of
inadmissible evidence.2 7 In the second case, the murder conviction was
affirmed, but this time on the ground that the lethal act was committed by
a co-felon in furtherance of the felony.2 This failure of the court to again
rest its decision on proximate cause principles may be significant and,
together with the instant case, may well foreshadow an ultimate overruling
of Alneida and a return to the agency theory of criminal responsibility.29
21. See Note, Felony Murder as a First Degree Offense: An Anachronism Re-
taned, 66 YAm L.J. 427 (1957).
22. See Morris, supra note 1, at 68.
23. See Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. Prrr. L. REV. 51
(1956) ; Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773, 803 (1958). See
also Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony Murder Rule, 1952 WAsH. U.L.Q. 191.
24. Schultz, supra note 20, at 224-25.
25. Morris, supra note 1, at 67.
26. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 'Pa. 550, 138 A.2d 447 (1958).
27. 381 Pa. 500, 113 A2d 464 (1955).
28. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 391 Pa. 550, 553, 138 A.2d 447, 449 (1958).
29. Chief Justice Jones admitted that the distinction between justifiable and
excusable homicide is more "incidental than legally significant!' but said, "[S]uch
distinction serves the useful purpose of thwarting further extension of the rule enunci-
ated in Commonwealth v. Altneida. . . ." and continued that "it will be time enough
for action in such regard [a reconsideration of Alnmeida] if and when a conviction
for murder based. on facts similar to those presented by the Almeida case should again
come before the court." Instant case, 137 A2d at 483.
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